LEXONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RATE
REGULATION
LEE LOEVINGER*

Government and business were more closely related in the 18th
century than today. For example, during the colonial period in
America state legislatures frequently established prices for many
items including.bread and other necessities. However, the system
was challenged in 1776 when Adam Smith published his great work,
The Wealth of Nations, and initiated an intellectual ferment that
became part of the developing industrial and technological
revolution. Under Smith's conceptual model of the free enterprise
system, the public interest-and the wealth of the nation as a
whole-was better served by an economic structure where each
enterprise set prices in response to the impersonal forces of the
market rather than government edict. This concept was so powerful
and well adapted to the needs of the time that it gained wide
acceptance in the following century and provided part of the
intellectual framework for the Constitution. Moreover, operation of
the American economy of the 19th century closely approximated
Smith's conceptualization of the free enterprise system.
During the latter part of the 19th century, the growing power of
large business aggregations created political demands for return to
some measure of governmental control of pricing. In 1876, only a
century after publication of Adam Smith's work, the Supreme Court
held that a state legislature could constitutionally establish
maximum prices to be charged by grain elevators since the elevators
were engaged in a business affected with a "public interest." 2 A
decade later Congress established the Interstate Commerce
Commission to regulate railroad rates and services. In the 1920s and
1930s similar agencies were established or endowed with power to
regulate rates and other activities of telegraph and telephone
companies, power companies, interstate pipelines, and common
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carriers., During the same period, the states commenced the
regulation of the rates or prices of these and a myriad of other
commercial activities.
The rate and price regulation of this early period was by direct
legislative action. In contrast, governmental control of rates and
prices in the 20th century has been almost exclusively through an
administrative agency established by the legislature and endowed
with delegated powers which are specified with varying degrees of
clarity by statute.
The significant aspect of the growth of governmental control of
prices in the 20th century is its development entirely on an ad hoc
basis. In areas where a strong need or a powerful political demand
for governmental action has been asserted, a regulatory agency has
been established. However, no conceptual model of regulatory action
has been postulated. Legally the regulatory agencies are regarded as
agents of the legislature, exercising quasi-legislative power.3 Yet this
approach fails to provide an understanding of how government can
or, more importantly, should control economic activity.
The* development of regulation has proceeded on the implicit
assumption that regulation acts simply and directly to produce a
desired result, and that the issuance of a rule or order by a regulatory
agency accomplishes the mandate and purpose of that rule or order
without complications. This assumption is uncritical, naive, and
unrealistic. Neither theory nor observation establishes any simple
relationship between regulatory action and the desired result. Theoretically, broadcasting licenses have no value and cannot be treated
as property; yet the limitation on entry into the field of broadcasting has made licenses extremely valuable and has clearly
affected prices and profits. Although the ICC was originally
established to prevent exploitation of the public by the railroads
through excessive or discriminatory rates, efforts in recent decades
have largely been directed toward minimizing competition between
railroads, motor carriers, and water carriers. Moreover, the ICC has
often sought to increase rather than decrease rates In 1965 the
3. For a detailed discussion of the history and theory behind legislative "delegation of
power" to regulatory agencies, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION 78, 33-40 (1965). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.05 (1959) which
discusses the quasi-judicial as well as the legislative role of the regulatory agency.
4. The influence of the "regulated" groups on ICC policy is noted in K. DAVIS, supra note
3, § 1.03, at7.
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Federal Communications Commission instituted its first formal
broad-scale investigation of telephone rates.5 Although the
investigation has not been completed, clearly no agreement exists on
determining either the rate base or a formula for establishing
reasonable rates or even for exercising the Commission's regulatory
power.6
Today we lack not only a rational theory ot tlie regulatory
function but also any general understanding of regulation itself. The
term is commonly used to encompass the various forms of
governmental action that affect the economy! Yet such usage is
clearly too crude for any rigorous analysis. Even a superficial
observation of the differences in the activity of such agencies as the
FCC, the ICC, the Federal Reserve Board, the Council of Economic
Advisers, and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division reveals
that a single term which purports to encompass these agencies'
varied activities is useless for purposes of economic analysis.
At the same time we must recognize that law and economics are
inextricably related and merely furnish different frameworks of
reference for common phenomena. Property, money and credit, contracts, corporations, and other basic elements of the economic order
are created and shaped by the legal framework. Correspondingly,
many basic concerns of law deal with economic matters. The
concept of due process protects property rights; similarly, current
legal developments in the areas of equal job opportunities,
educational facilities, medicare, consumer protection,'and control of
inflation are directed toward economic goals.
Thus any rational analysis must recognize that law and
economics constitute a single system and treat them accordingly.
Although the term applied to this system is not of paramount
importance, the unitary relationship between law and economics in
5. AT&T Charges for Services, 2 F.C.C.2d 142, 173 (1965); 2 F.C.C.2d 877 (1966); 4
F.C.C.2d 253 (1966); 5 F.C.C.2d 89 (1966); 9 F.C.C.2d 30 & 960 (1967); 11 F.C.C.2d 493

(1968).
6. The parties to the AT&T rate proceeding before the FCC have nominally reached
agreement on the principles to govern the establishment of rates. However, the stipulation is
simply a statement of generalities, and the current status of the several proceedings involving

AT&T rates has been described by the most authoritative publication in the field as a

"morass." 36 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, No. 21, p. 10 (Mar. 23, 1970). Three different proceedings involving AT&T rates in seven major categories of interstate service are
now pending, and the problem of applicable rate-making principles is reappearing as contested
issues in all of these proceedings. Id.
7. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 3, at 4-6.
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modern society should be recognized. The obvious significance and
scope of the term "lexonomics" suggest its use for this purpose. The
logical implications of the approach which the term implies may be
somewhat less obvious and warrant adumbration:
Proceeding upon the assumption that the areas encompassed by
the traditional disciplines of law and economics are integrally
related, lexonomic analysis seeks to differentiate the various modes
of governmental action and to describe the economic effects of such
action. If the approach of lexonomic analysis is adopted, several
distinct modes of governmental action appear immediately.
First is exhortation, the process of governmental advocacy
without coercion. The wage-price guidelines promulgated
periodically by the Council of Economic Advisers are a familiar
example.
Legislation, the authoritative promulgation of general rules
enforceable by governmental action, presents the second possible
mode of lexonomic activity. A prominent example is provided by the
antitrust laws.
The third lexonomic mode is government influence on fiscal and
monetary policy to provide substantial power over the aggregate
economy. By adjusting the balance between governmental
expenditures and total receipts, the federal government achieves this
control over fiscal or budgetary policy. Similarly, the Federal
Reserve Board, an independent body created by congressional
legislation, influences the amount of money available-and therefore
the flow of the economy-through its monetary and banking
policies. The importance of this activity, especially in relation to
monetary policy, has recently gained increased recognition.
Fourth is government subsidy which involves payment by the
government to either public or .private entities on condition that the
recipient take specified action. Although subsidization of private
enterprise is diminishing, the use of subsidies to secure state
cooperation toward desired federal objectives is increasing.
Fifth, the use of both positive and negative tax incentives to
accomplish social objectives has also been increasing recently.
Achievement of desired economic effects through use of the
government's economic power in the market as a buyer or seller is
8. For a more complete statement of lexonomic concepts and criteria see Locvingcr,
LeonomicAnalysis andAntitrusi, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 313 (1969).
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the sixth mode of action. Examples are government purchasing,
imposition of required conditions in contracts between the
government and private contractors, and the sale of stockpiled
materials to influence price levels.
Seventh is the mode of regulation, the authoritative and coercive
action to permit, require, or forbid specified activity. Common
examples are the issuance of licenses by such agencies as the ICC
and the FCC, the concomitant limitations on the licensees, and the
entry of cease and desist orders by those agencies.
Government operation, sometimes called socialization or
nationalization, is the eighth mode of action. Governmental control
through the ownership of the sole or dominant enterprise in a field
or market is generally involved. Familiar examples are government
operation of the postal and educational systems.
This particular analysis of modes of lexonomic operation is not
necessarily final or definitive, and other theories and terminology
might be employed. However, it is important to recognize thiat government action is not all of a uniform kind and to realize the variety
in the potential modes of lexonomic action. As society develops,
problems proliferate, and the economic structure becomes more
complex, other variant modes of lexonomic action will likely be
developed in addition to those currently recognized.
The present law of rate regulation reflects both the complete
absence of any theory of regulatory function and the failure to
distinguish or consider the numerous possible variants of lexonomic
action. For many years the basic law of ratemaking was set forth
in Smyth v. Ames, which held that all calculations concerning the
reasonableness of utility rates must be based on the fair value of the
property being used for the benefit of the public. The lack of any
real agreement on how to determine the fair value of the rate base
presented a recurring problem. At various times the courts approved
the use of market value, original cost, reproduction cost, and value
to a prudent investor. 0
In 1944 the Hope Gas" case discarded the prescriptions of
Smyth v. Ames and held that the method by which a regulatory
9. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
10. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 159-71 (1961);
Rose, The Hope Case and Public Utility Valuation in the States, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 188
(1954).
I1. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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agency determines what charges are just and reasonable is not
important so long as the agency's conclusion is proper. The Supreme
Court noted that "[i]t is not [the] theory but the impact of the rate
order which counts.' 2 Without challenging the majority's
fundamental approach, three dissenting justices argued that the rates
should be fixed to provide more adequate incentives for the efficient
production and use of the resource involved. Thus, present law
clearly affords a regulatory agency great latitude in its approach to
ratemaking. The rates cannot be set so low that the utilities are
denied the revenue required for operating expenses and capital costs;
neither may the rates be so high that customers of the regulated
industry are oppressed by inordinate expense for the services desired.
Such indefinite limits invite further exploration.
The typical rate-making case involves the collection of extensive
accounting and statistical data as well as volumes of testimony from
highly qualified technical experts. These immense records are
diligently inspected as if the proper rate will somehow mysteriously
emerge in the manner of an ancient hieroglyphic message deciphered
by assiduous archeological study. But data do not dictate decisions;
even the most thorough scrutiny of the mass of evidence in ratemaking cases never points unequivocally to a particular result. Some
animating principle, some theory which postulates the regulatory
purpose to be served and constructs a paradigm for achieving that
purpose, is needed to direct regulatory action in the light of the
paradigm of function and the social purpose sought.
The apparent theory of many commentators and regulators
assumes that protection of the public interest compels unyielding
opposition to every private interest. While this approach offers both
simplicity and emotional appeal by reducing complex technical
problems to clear moral issues, it is almost certainly a demagogic
fallacy. The public interest is not some great impersonal idol which
requires the sacrifice of all private interests. Rather it is an
abstraction used to subsume and denominate a judgment
representing the greatest good for the greatest number in a particular
situation.13 A rational approach to the protection of the public
interest requires an effort to utilize privite interest in motivating
actions that will serve the public. The challenge confronting
12. Id. at 602.
13. See generally SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1960); Loevinger, Regulation and
Competition as Alternatives, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 101, 129-33 (1966).
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regulators is not to frustrate the self-seeking assertion of private
interests but to devise techniques for guiding such powerful forces
toward the achievement of socially desirable goals.
The problem of ratemaking is the establishment of a mode of
government supervision, or lexonomic action, which will protect the
public against exploitation by a utility operating in a limited entry
or monopolistic situation and yet provide incentives for innovation
and efficiency by the utility. The most efficient and economical
service is not necessarily secured by requiring the use of the cheapest
equipment or insisting upon the lowest remuneration to management
and investors. Let us take a hypothetical illustration. Suppose a
telephone company in need of a large amount of money in order to
secure and install costlier and more efficient equipment can attract
capital in the money market only by offering a very high rate of
return. Permitting the company to secure this money by paying a
high rate of return will enable acquisition of the desired equipment,
thereby increasing the rate base and profits; but the efficiency of the
telephone service will also be increased and may ultimately result in
decreased charges to the individual users. In such circumstances the
public interest is obviously served by allowing an increased rate base
and a higher rate of return. Unfortunately the facts are never so
clear as in this hypothetical illustration. Dispute always develops
concerning the rate of return required to attract capital and the
identification of items to be included in the rate base.
The details of accounting evidence and the testimony of variops
experts, the traditional bases of ratemaking decisions, fail to reach
the fundamental objective of devising an approach that will provide
the maximum incentive to the utility to achieve efficient and
economical operation. Such operation is not achieved by imposing
the strictest or the most detailed regulatory supervision and control.
On the contrary, regulated companies, like those in the unregulated
segment of the economy, are most likely to strive for improved
products and services if given the hope that they may thereby earn
the reward of greater profit.
The traditional rate of return approach permits few alternative
variations. Under the conventional view, the duty of the regulatory
agency is to scrutinize the rate base rigorously to insure that no item
is included that can reasonably be excluded and that no amount
included is any larger than can be justified by necessity. The rate of
return is set at the minimum that will permit capital to be secured
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and that will avoid unreasonable or confiscatory use of investors'
capital. The rates are then calculated on the basis of these
operations.
But this approach furnishes no incentive to improve products or
service; on the contrary, the utility's only hope of securing larger
profit lies in increasing the rate base. Thus the conventional
approach provides a positive incentive to increase the cost of
providing service, because the amount allowed as profit is figured as
a percentage based on the total capital c6st. The more the utility
.spends for assets comprising the rate base, the greater are total
profits. Consequently, the conventional approach establishes an
economic incentive for inefficiency. The operation of most regulated
utilities in an efficient manner despite the structural disincentives of
the' regulatory system is a tribute to the inherent integrity of most
business executives.
An alternative rate-making approach might be the imposition of
a relatively low rate of return without rigorous scrutiny of the rate
base or operating costs. This method would provide a temporary
incentive to increase profit by reducing operating costs and capital
equilment expenditures. However, if the same rate of return were
continuously applied to the new reduced rate base, the incentive for
operating economy and efficiency would quickly disappear. The
utility could advantageously increase its costs and rate base just as
under the conventional approach. Thus this approach also provides
an incentive to maximize profit by operating inefficiently and
increasing costs.
A third alternative contemplates investigation of the rate base
and operating costs to insure that only items and amounts actually
related to efficient operation are included but permits a wide range
of fluctuation in the rate of return. This approach would postulate
a reasonable rate of return, and then set rates designed to permit
realization of a rate of return equal to or slightly greater than that
required minimum. The rate of return could then increase within a
relatively wide range'so long as the actual rates charged users did
not increase and the service 'continued to improve. The approach
offers some economic incentive for improving service and increasing
efficiency and economy in ol'eration, since both the public and the
company share the resulting rewards. However, when the company
reached the upper limit of its permissible rate of return, the rates
would again be reduced.
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Other considerations also support the range of permissible return
approach. First, no regulatory agency can foresee the future with
clarity and confidence. When a regulatory agency relies upon strict
supervision of rate base, rate of return, and service charges, it incurs
the burden of constant oversight and continuous consideration of
changing economic circumstances. Allowing fluctuation of the rate
of return within a wide range relieves the agency of the necessity of
reexamining the rate structure with every change of economic
circumstance and compels reconsideration only at much longer
intervals. Second, the agency possesses neither the data nor the
techniques for arriving at a proper specific rate of return. An
elementary principle in science and statistics states that the results
of a mathematical operation can be stated with no greater precision
than that of the least precise factor or number used in the
operation." Testimony concerning the rate of return represents
estimates of businessmen, economists, and statisticians. Such
estimates are based on masses of data and, in some cases, on
prodigies of mathematical ingenuity in devising formulas. However,
the data are usually derived from businesses only remotely
comparable or roughly analogous to the utility, and the formulas
used contain variables that depend upon the transformation of
subjective judgments into quantitative terms. Evidence of this kind
does not logically support a determination stated in very precise
numerical terms, but only a broad and imprecise judgment.
Thus the public purposes of regulation, current economic theory,
and the logical limitations of inference combine to require that a rate
of return be established only within a relatively wide range of
permissible variation. Furthermore, establishing a range of
reasonableness for a rate of return clearly does not imply that any
rate beyond that range is ipso facto unreasonable. There may be
inadequate evidence or an unwillingness to decide that particular
rates are reasonable and also no proof to determine that they are
unreasonable. In most cases the evidence will show that a fairly wide
14. For example, an observer might stand on a street corner and estimate the weight of
each person who passed by. If all estimates were recorded, they could be added and averaged
and the result could be stated mathematically to three, four, or more decimal places. However,
it would be misleading and quite unscientific and illogical to state the results in such a fashion.
At best, the results of such a process could not properly be stated any more closely than in
pounds, not in ounces or fractions of a pound. The evidence in rate cases in many respects
resembles the kind of data that might be gathered by an eye witness estimate of the weight of
passersby on a street corner.

756 ,

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:747

range of rates is reasonable under the conventional view; that on
each side of this range exists another range that is not clearly
reasonable or unreasonable; and that only rates considerably beyond
the range are clearly unreasonable. Although this conclusion seems
compelled by experience with actual rate cases, by the limitaiions of
statistical inference, and by the desirability of establishing incentives
to efficiency, it goes considerably beyond the position that the
regulatory authorities have been willing to take thus far.
Even this modified version of rate 'of return ratemaking does not
provide a wholly satisfactory solution or promise to satisfy all the
criteria of lexonomic action. No matter how applied, the rate of
return approach to ratemaking involves a tunnel-vision analysis
which distracts the ratemaking process to such esoteric issues as
whether the cost of services should be based on fully distributed or
incremental costs and whether investment credit and accelerated
depreciation used for tax purposes should "flow through" to current
customers or be "normalized" by accounting procedures. The
answers to these issues are truly arcane and without rational
principle for sendible determination. Conflicting views represent no
more than the particular prejudices and interests of the parties; the
inordinately complex and voluminous arguments are simply verbal

facades to mask the arbitrary nature of the choice.
Fresh thinking by the most creative minds in the field of
lexonomics should seek to develop a new functional paradigm which
will offer a choice of alternatives to the traditional scholastic dispute
concerning the amount of profit that can be balanced on the pinhead
of conventional rate-making dogma. While the precise approach that
may prove most useful cannot be stated, some of the characteristics
of any useful approach can be described and some possibilities for
further discussion and exploration may be suggested. This need not
be as difficult as it seems. A great deal can be learned by using the
scientists' method of hypothesizing and engaging in conceptual
experiments. To take a very simple, extreme, and impractical
example, suppose" that dividends on the stocks of all regulated
utilities were exempted from, or given special favorable treatment in,
the federal income taxation statutes. What would be the result?
Obviously such stocks would become much more desirable and
increase in price with no change in service or rate of return. Without
any action by a regulatory agency, the rate-making process and the
positions of both stockholders and customers would change
drastically.
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For another result, postulate action by the Securities and
Exchange Commission requiring that all expenditures for capital
equipment be charged to expenses in the year incurred. This would
be accelerated depreciation with a vengeance. Without a change in
rates, profits would plummet and stock prices would surely follow.
While neither of these hypothetical possibilities is either practical or
wise, this highly abbreviated analysis suggests the insight that may
be gained by the conceptual technique.
One alternative to rate of return ratemaking is limitation of the
profit margin. Rate of return ratemaking is based on a regulatory
obsession with the investor. The theory considers it wicked, or at
least unfair, if the investor makes too much money on his
investment. While some regulators are also concerned that the
investor should not receive too little, rates are generally set less to
protect the consumer than to frustrate the investor. As previously
noted, this results in establishing incentives for high cost operation
and inefficiency. No regulatory method effectively guards against
this or seriously attempts to prevent it. Under present theory, the
ends of regulatory action are satisfied so long as the investor does
not receive excessive profits, regardless of the degree and cost of
service to the customer.
But rate regulation exists because the utility has a monopoly
position and is not subject to the check of competitive market forces.
Theoretically the regulatory agency is using its legal power to
provide some of the same effects achieved by economic forces in a
competitive market. However, while the competitive model focuses
on prices, the regulatory process suffers inherent weaknesses through
its concentration on gross profits or rates of return in attempting to
regulate prices.
A regulatory agency could limit the utility's profit margin by an
5
order that no charge to the public for any commodity or service
could include more than a specified maximum percentage or amount
of profit to the utility by any acceptable method of accounting,
Superficially this may sound like rate of return ratemaking, but it is
actually quite different. To begin with, profit margin limitation does
not involve the regulatory agency in the impossible task of
15. "Commodity" and "service" are probably tautological terms since, in economic
theory, commodity includes service. However, the terms are frequently used in legal discussion
as complementary and no significance is to be attached to their use either together or singly

in this discussion.
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attempting to analyze and validate the rate structure. Profit margin
limitation would not impose the rigidity on rates characteristic of
conventional regulation. While this approach requires no particular
method of accounting, it probably would encourage the use of fully
distributed costs in order to minimize the profit margin. Most
important, however, profit margin limitation provides incentives for
innovation, efficiency, and rate reduction.
Under conventional rate-making principles, any reduction in
expenditures for capital equipment reduces both the rate base and
the resulting profit the utility is permitted to make. A new invention
providing better service for a fraction of the utility's historical cost
is catastrophic to the utility under this system. The satellite
communications industry offers a practical- example.,Satellites
promise to provide future transoceanic circuits much more cheaply
than older cable circuits. The satellite communications companies
will be permitted to charge rates and make a profit only on the basis
of their investments. Consequently, Comsat and the established
communications carriers are engaged in a bitter struggle for the right
to in'v'est in the ground stations, the most expensive part of the
satellite system. The greatest single problem confronting Comsat, as
a regulated utility, is not the development of new technology but the
problem of investing enough capital to establish an adequate rate
base.
Under profit margin limitation the incentives would be reversed.
Certainly initial determination of the reasonable profit margin will
involve great disagreement and possibly bitter dispute. But once the
profit margin has been set by legal action, the utility could maximize
its gross profit by attaining the greatest efficiency and economy,
establishing the lowest prices or rates, and securing the greatest
volume of business. Under this rate-making theory, an invention
providing better service at lower capital cost permits a rate reduction
without a significant decrease in return to the utility and encourages
ai / increase in overall business limited only by the elasticity of
demand. The aggregate profit to the utility increases as does the rate
of return based on the decreased capital cost. Moreover, while the
efficiency of the utility's service increases and both the utility and
its stockholders concomitantly earn a greater profit, the cost to the
customers will decrease. Thus technological improvements confer a
financial benefit on not only the customers but also the utility and
its stockholders. This approach to ratemaking could probably
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minimize, if not eliminate, the present conflict between the
communications carriers and Comsat.
Another alternative approach to ratemaking might be to control
or limit the rate level by maintaining rates at a constant ratio to the
general price level. Rate reductions would naturally be permitted and
might even be encouraged by some device such as relieving the utility
from imposition of an excess profits surtax on increases in overall
profits during any year in which the rate level declined relative to
the general price level. This approach would probably involve greater
rigidity in the rate structure than profit margin limitation, but it
provides greater incentive to efficiency and economical service than
the present conventional approach. Described most simply, rate level
limitation permits the utility to earn overall profit without limitation
so long as constant dollar rates to the consumer remain steady or
decrease and service is maintained. This reverses the present
approach and directs regulatory action to securing satisfactory and
economical service to the public rather than merely preventing the
stockholders from receiving too much.
Ultimately, however, any theory is probably insufficient to
enable a government bureaucracy to supervise a pricing decision with
the wisdom rate regulation requires. Other lexonomic modes or
devices are much more likely to provide the means for controlling
prices in monopoly situations. One such possibility is a legal
requirement for competitive procurement of equipment and supplies.
Such a requirement has been imposed by statute on Comsat and
seems to be fairly effective. Of course, competitive procurement
introduces market forces into only one aspect of monopolistic
situations. However, the stringency and scope of regulation are
correlative to the strength and extent of the utility's monopolistic
power. Competitive procurement and stringency and scope of
regulation thus are trade-offs with greater competition -in
procurement diminishing the need for extensive regulation.
Beyond this, lexonomic analysis may suggest a way to approach
elimination of the need for utility rate regulation altogether. Because
physical or economic factors limit the market to a single telephone,
telegraph, electric power, gas, or other utility service, the utility is
the only source of a needed commodity or service and competition
is impossible or impractical. The customer, having no alternative,
must buy from the utility at any price set and has no economic
power to influence that price. Thus the customer turns to the
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government for legal power to influence the price. The regulatory
agency is a remote, ambivalent, unrepresentative, and ineffective
surrogate for the customer. If a means could be devised to give the
customer direct representation and effectivepower to influence prices
and service, rate regulation would be undesirable and unnecessary.
Such customer power can be established by a fairly simple
means. If the customers of a utility were allowed to elect
representatives to the corporate board of directors, they would
probably be better informed and more influential over prices and
service than any government regulatory agency. An experimental
approach to this device might be implemented by a statutory
provision allowing a utility providing for customer elected directors
in its corporate structure to be exempt from regulatory rate
control' 6
The idea of "outside" or "public" directors is, of course, rather
common. The Communications Satellite Act of 196211 provides that
Comsat shall have three directors appointed by the President of the
United States,"8 although whether these directors represent the
government or the public is unclear. In any event, the idea of
corporate outsiders sitting on a board of directors is neither
unprecedented nor impractical.
While the situation may have been different in an earlier era, the
utility's customers appear to have as great a financial stake in the
utility as its stockholders and to be entitled to some voice in its
operation as a matter of equity. Indeed, this theory is the
conventional justification for rate regulation by the government. If
the'stockholders and the customers each elect an equal number of
directors, the customers will possess power over rates and prices at
16. It should be noted that this suggestion of customer elected directors was made when

this paper was first presented at the Iowa State University Conference on Public Utility
Valuation and Rate Making, on April 24, 1969, which was prior to the recent effort to elect

"'consumer" directors to the General Motors board to represent consumer interests and other

objectives considered socially desirable. There is a significant difference between the proposal
to put directors on the board of an unregulated business corporation to pursue vaguely defined

social objectives and the proposal suggested here to substitute customer elected representation
for bureaucratic regulation with respect to rates and services of regulated public utilities.

However, the interest aroused by the campaign to put "consumer" directors on the boards
of business corporations indicates at least the probability that there will be sufficient customer
interest in the election of directors to utility boards to provide the possibility of successful
operation of such a plan.
17. 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1964).

18. Id. § 733(a).
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least equal to their power in a competitive market. In all probability,
the customer representatives' interest will concentrate on quality and
efficiency of service as much as lower rates. In any event,
representatives would have access to all relevant data and share in
ultimate control of operating and pricing policy. Furthermore, the
single purpose and private status of customer elected directors frees
them from the political pressures and ambitions that intrusively
motivate some regulators. Thus the need for government regulation
of rates would disappear.
The device of customer elected directors on utility corporate
boards obviously is most easily adopted by telephone, electric power,
and other utilities with a readily identifiable and stable group of
customers. Customer elected directors would be more difficult to
provide for air lines, railroads, and similar enterprises with
temporary and transient customers. However, if the concept should
prove practical, ingenuity could adapt it to the varying situations of
different utilities. Compared to the present system of rate regulation,
customer election of utility directors promises to be simple, nonpolitical, non-bureaucratic, and effective. Further consideration is
certainly merited.
Analysis should not ignore the ancient principle that no
government agency is ever wholly abolished or deprived of all
functions. Undoubtedly attendant difficulties and problems will arise
in establishing a system of customer elected directors and in
conducting elections among utility customers. The regulatory,
agencies might conveniently and appropriately supervise the'
establishment of the system and oversee the vote, somewhat as the
National Labor Relations Board now supervises voting in the
election of labor union representatives. Perhaps the most effective
action a government agency can take to regulate utility rates is to
supervise the election of customer elected members of the utility's
board of directors and thereafter engage in the collection and
publication of statistics about utility rates.
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